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the interest of the rich to help the poor, because of the many 
interdependencies that characterize the life of the community, 
at whatever scale–local or global–the community is deined. 
Seen from this angle, the implementation of poverty reduc-
tion initiatives is not always a manifestation of altruism, but 
rather the result of economic calculation. Such initiatives 
cannot, however, be purely individual; they need coordi-
nation mechanisms to be put in place, which are, to a large 
 extent, the basis for public action in many areas. 
One area very familiar to specialists in the ight against 
poverty is that of oficial development aid, which funds many 
public or private anti-poverty projects in developing coun-
tries. It is an undeniable fact that oficial development assis-
tance is, in certain circumstances, motivated by altruistic 
goals of ighting poverty. One could cite the example of the 
aid given to international organizations like the UNDP. And 
indeed the aid agencies say just that in their policy state-
ments, which seek to present oficial development assistance 
as a disinterested action in favor of underprivileged nations. 
But looking beyond this discourse, studies by many econo-
mists suggest that oficial development aid is not necessarily 
motivated by the altruism of developed nations. It is often 
underpinned by objectives related to the production of global 
public goods (Severino, in this volume), or even sometimes 
by mere political or commercial objectives speciic to the do-
nor countries (Berthélemy, 2006). These lines of reasoning 
present the ight against poverty as a kind of secondary objec-
tive, through which other issues are being addressed, and 
there is, in that case, precious little chance that the actions 
undertaken will prove totally effective in reducing poverty 
(Alesina & Dollar, 2000). We should therefore not be sur-
prised if–as regularly asserted in debates on the effectiveness 
of oficial development assistance–international anti-poverty 
policies are only partly successful in achieving their aim. 
Kerouedan (in this volume) provides a relevant example, in 
her discussion of aid to Africa in the health sector. 
Equally, it is worth asking whether instruments like oficial 
development assistance are really best suited to dealing with 
these problems. The idea of giving fresh impetus to oficial 
development assistance in order to help poor countries, for 
Conclusion
Between Altruism and the Market:  
an Economist’s View of the Fight Against Poverty
Jean-Claude Berthélemy
Professor of Economics, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne
It is no easy task to conclude this special issue of FACTS 
Reports, given the sheer breadth and diversity of the analyses 
it contains. One would need in-depth knowledge of a whole 
range of ields–anthropology, sociology, history, law, man-
agement, economics–to adequately identify all of the lessons 
that can be drawn from these papers. 
Let me, then, stay with my own ield of competence, and 
offer a conclusion from the standpoint of an economist.
The ight against poverty is, admittedly, an area where 
economists have every reason to be modest. The results of the 
actions undertaken by public and private agencies to reduce 
poverty using economic instruments designed to increase the 
income of the poor have fallen well short of our aspirations. 
Moreover, and more fundamentally, economic theory based 
on the principle of individual rationality is not well suited to 
the logic of altruism that to a large extent underpins these 
poverty reduction initiatives.
The standard economic approach relies on economic actors 
exercising their individual freedom to pursue wealth, which, 
according to the founding principles set out by Adam Smith, 
also furthers the collective welfare. But the exercise of any 
freedom is associated with duties, and the exercise of these 
duties–of the rich toward the poor–is a key element in the 
ight against poverty (Kourilsky, in this volume). Following 
on from this logic, and looking at roles of the irms in society, 
it can be argued that their primary responsibilities, i.e. their 
economic and inancial responsibilities to their shareholders, 
are not incompatible with their social responsibilities to their 
employees, and their wider societal and environmental re-
sponsibilities (Renouard, in this volume). 
As these points of view suggest, the strictly economic ap-
proach is arguably not the right one to meet the challenges of 
the ight against poverty. One may then want to turn to an 
alternative approach, suc as anthropology (Marie, in this vol-
ume). Economic theory does, however, enable us to construct 
lines of reasoning pointing to the conclusion that it can be in 
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example, to participate in the actions required to slow down 
climate change clearly stems from good intentions, but surely 
the irst question to ask is: What are the best instruments for 
combatting global warming? As it happens, priority assis-
tance should probably be given–as indeed it is under the UN 
Clean Development Mechanism–to the large emerging coun-
tries which are also large potential polluters, rather than to 
countries that are really in need but whose contribution to 
greenhouse gas emissions is only marginal. Or again, inject-
ing oficial development aid to satisfy the commercial inter-
ests of major national corporations, as happens in the case of 
tied aid, is not necessarily the most appropriate way to re-
spond to the demands of any particular pressure group.
Likewise, at a more microeconomic level, in private anti-
poverty initiatives, one might ask how much is down to al-
truism and how much is down to economic calculation. In 
social business, for example, what proportion is altruistic 
action and what proportion an attempt to create and capture 
new markets? There is doubtless no single answer to this 
question, and several of the papers in this special issue cite 
examples of how social entrepreneurs, driven by a sense of 
social responsibility, have helped to reduce poverty. These 
experiences should, however, be analyzed with some cau-
tion. Some of the advocates of the “base of the pyramid” 
approach have observed, after ten years of experience, that 
the approach does not work well when it takes enterprise 
leaders too far away from their core business (Simanis & 
Milstein, in this volume). According to Abraham (in this 
 volume), the social lens should belong to the investor, 
whose role is to identify promising investment projects 
that would serve the needs of the poor, and not to the entre-
preneur, whose role is to implement eficiently these proj-
ects. It seems preferable therefore to bank on joint ventures 
between proit-seeking private companies and not-for-
proit organizations, where each party brings in its own par-
ticular abilities (Yunus, Sibieude & Lesueur, and Thieme & 
DeKoszmovszky, in this volume). More generally, alliance-
building enables private irms and non-proit actors to trans-
form each other and mutually reinforce their efforts to 
 reduce poverty (Lemoine & Carré, in this volume). 
We should be wary, however, of a vision that portrays busi-
ness and the market–driven by the quest for proit–on one 
side, and non-proit organizations, of exemplary altruism, on 
the other. When non-governmental organizations mobilize to 
help the poor, they do so, in many cases, out of altruism, but 
in other cases they do so for other motives, such as using 
humanitarian actions as a means of proselytizing deprived 
populations. In such cases, poverty reduction is, once again, 
only a secondary objective, facilitating the achievement of 
other objectives that are not necessarily altruistic. 
To round off this analysis of the role that the altruistic goal 
of helping the poor can play in poverty reduction strategies, 
it is worth reiterating a simple rule about matching instru-
ments to objectives. This rule, which economists ascribe to 
Tinbergen, is that there must be one policy tool for each 
 policy target, and vice versa. If we have two targets, such as 
satisfying particular interests, or the goals of an interest 
group, and also helping the poor, then we must assign a 
 different tool to each target. 
This rule may seem simplistic and therefore ill suited to the 
complexity of the modern world, but it has the merit of em-
phasizing the need to impose strict requirements of eficiency 
on anti-poverty actions. This eficiency requirement cannot be 
ignored, even in the context of genuinely disinterested ac-
tions; ignoring it would render such actions partially futile, or 
even would frustrate them. The propensity for altruism is not 
ininitely elastic, and the resources that can be drawn upon to 
reduce poverty will inevitably tend to diminish if the expected 
results are not forthcoming. This problem will be all too famil-
iar to those who study public opinion on development aid. 
In this vein, if we are serious about improving the effec-
tiveness of the ight against poverty, we would do well to 
supplement the Tinbergen rule with another basic economic 
rule, the rule of speciicity, which is useful for studying the 
formulation of public economic policies. This rule states 
that, to be truly eficient, the chosen instruments must di-
rectly address the root causes of the problem, not its indirect 
causes. This makes it essential to understand the origins and 
dynamics of poverty in order to be able to use the available 
resources as eficiently as possible, in the longer term. The 
production and dissemination of knowledge about poverty 
must therefore be seen as a central part of the initiatives re-
quired to ight poverty eficiently and effectively. 
Take, for example, social protection programs. Currently, 
the prevailing logic, as observed notably at the World Bank, 
is to develop social protection in three dimensions: pre-
vention, protection and promotion. This logic is based on a 
 speciic analysis of poverty, according to which transferring 
income or other resources to the poor is not suficient to ight 
poverty effectively. There are phenomena such as poverty 
traps (Barrett, Carter & Ikegami, 2008), into which people 
fall unless prevention mechanisms are put in place. These 
poverty traps are characterized as states of stable equilibrium 
from which it is particularly dificult to exit once one has 
fallen into them. For example, as studied by Dalsace, Vincent, 
Berger & Dalens (in this volume), there are penalties of pov-
erty, through which the poor pay goods that they consume at 
a higher price than non-poor people, which immiserize them 
further and contribute to prevent them from escaping poverty. 
As a consequence of povery trap phenomena, it often costs 
more to get someone out of poverty ex post than to imple-
ment ex ante prevention against the risks associated with life 
events that can reduce people to poverty. This prevention 
policy is made all the more necessary that the incomes of the 
poor are characterized by great variability and unpredictabil-
ity (Morduch, in this volume). In parallel, promotion initia-
tives must be envisaged, to enable those of the poor who have 
the potential to do so to escape from poverty in a sustainable 
way, thanks to the aid they are given initially. To be effective, 
this exit from poverty must be accompanied by a change of 
state, by which those leaving poverty behind regain their 
ability to meet their own needs without depending on aid. In 
a market economy, this principle demands that the exit from 
poverty must be accompanied by the reintegration of the for-
merly poor into normal market relations, from which they are 
usually excluded (Fontaine, in this volume). 
If we adopt this poverty-trap analysis, it becomes clear that 
without a detailed understanding of how and why people fall 
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into the poverty trap, it is impossible to ight poverty effec-
tively. There are probably multiple factors at work, which may 
to a large extent relect the concept of loss of capabilities. 
Pushing this logic to its extreme, it could also be argued 
that social protection programs should start by targeting those 
of the poor who have the best chance of bouncing back and 
escaping the poverty trap forever, thanks to the aid they re-
ceive; this would free up resources to provide longer-term 
support for the most deprived. This type of targeting might be 
unacceptable on moral grounds, because it might mean help 
the less needy among the poor, but raising the possibility at 
least has the merit of showing that it needs to be discussed 
when implementing social protection programs. More gener-
ally, it is essential for the long-term viability of all anti- 
poverty actions, including social protection programs, that 
they take into account the cost-effectiveness ratio of the 
 various potential alternatives. 
Likewise, conditional cash transfer programs–the best-
known being Mexico’s Progresa program and Brazil’s Bolsa 
Familia program–are founded on the idea that simply transfer-
ring income to the poor is not effective, and that it needs to be 
backed up, irstly, by strong incentives to acquire the  necessary 
capabilities to get out of poverty, notably through education 
and health, and secondly, by conducting complementary ac-
tions aimed at extracting the poor from the situation of vulner-
ability in which they start out (Mourão & Macedo de Jesus, in 
this volume). Unless we can restore capabilities of the poor 
and reduce their vulnerability, any poverty reduction program 
based on transfers will be ineffective; the transfers will simply 
have to continue for an indeinite duration, and the resulting 
costs would escalate out of control. 
Economic research on poverty, and on development eco-
nomics in general, can probably help to improve the cost- 
effectiveness ratio of poverty reduction programs, as the 
 previous examples suggest. In this special issue, we are pre-
sented with other examples, thanks to papers that help us get 
a better grasp on the very deinition of the word poverty, 
showing that it has multiple facets, beyond poverty in terms 
of absolute income (Damon, and Supiot, in this volume). But 
economic research can offer only partial responses to the 
challenge of poverty, and the ight against poverty is so ur-
gent that we simply do not have time to wait for economic 
research to come up with all the answers. Moreover, as in all 
the social sciences, the object of study of poverty research 
evolves over time, entailing a constant reassessment of our 
knowledge. We must therefore be pragmatic in designing 
processes that have a realistic chance of helping to foster 
greater effectiveness in the ight against poverty. On irst 
analysis, from an economist’s standpoint, the method that 
springs to mind is to introduce the market economy princi-
ples into the formulation of altruistic actions. This special is-
sue provides many examples, both historic and present-day, 
of just such a combination. Social entrepreneurship is a case 
in point. We also see it when large private foundations  support 
anti-poverty actions while requiring that they be designed 
and conducted according to the same principles of eficiency 
and effectiveness that hold sway in their parent companies. 
GAVI and other actions supported by the Gates Foundation 
are good examples. 
It would be naïve, however, to think that the market, or that 
private enterprise, inherently knows how to identify the most 
eficient or effective solutions. In the economic theory of mar-
kets, one can reasonably postulate that a irm that is less well 
managed will eventually disappear, as it will make losses due 
to competitive pressure and will end up losing its capacity to 
invest, or even its capital. There is therefore a kind of natural 
selection at work: according to this analysis, the market tends 
toward greater eficiency. But even in a market economy this 
outcome has its limits, as attested by the many dysfunctions 
on display in the inancial sphere, where the herd behaviors 
ultimately prevail, leading to the crises we see around us, and 
impeding the eficiency of the economic system. 
If we are looking to the market to make altruistic actions 
more effective, we are even more likely to be disappointed. 
Almost by deinition, the law of natural selection does not 
operate in this context: an altruistic enterprise can survive 
even if it loses money, because it sources its funding from 
disinterested donations. One might argue that making differ-
ent poverty reduction projects compete for donations would 
incentivize them to achieve a better cost-effectiveness ratio. 
But a world where poverty reduction projects were always in 
competition would probably lead, also, to bad incentives. 
Actors would lose sight of the initial objectives–helping the 
poor–instead seeking only to maintain the long-term viability 
of their projects, and focusing on actions with instant visibil-
ity. Taking a dispassionate look around the world of NGOs 
currently active in the development ield, it seems we are not 
a million miles from that situation already. 
Without minimizing the contribution of market economics 
to the search for greater eficiency and effectiveness in pov-
erty reduction projects, we must thefefore ind alternative, or 
complementary, ways to elicit the most effective actions. The 
FACTS initiative has clearly identiied one such technique: 
disseminating a maximum of information about good and bad 
practices, and leveraging a peer review mechanism to pro-
mote the former at the expense of the latter (Kourilsky, in this 
volume). This approach, which seeks to introduce the meth-
ods of the experimental sciences into ground-level projects, 
already has a counterpart in development economics re-
search, where studies drawing on randomized trials contrib-
ute, alongside more analytical work, to the task of identifying 
anti-poverty actions that are likely to yield results, as illus-
trated in this volume by Bates, Glennerster, Gumede & Dulo, 
who show that asking the poor to pay even a minimal price 
for health or education services might be counterproductive. 
Of course, such an approach can only bear fruit over the 
longer term, but the same is true of the natural selection 
mechanisms of the market economy. Moreover, this approach 
has the merit of being consistent, in its philosophy, with the 
altruistic goals behind poverty reduction projects: if we have 
the same goals, why compete–when we can cooperate, by 
sharing information about good practices? 
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